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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW EXCEPTION TO THE 
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE:  REDRESSING HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Joshua Gregory Holt† 
Abstract: In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Papua 
New Guinea residents’ alleged human rights violations and environmental tort claims 
under customary international law and the Alien Tort Claims Act.  The Ninth Circuit 
decided that jus cogens norms precluded application of the Act of State Doctrine.  The 
United States Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino decided that U.S. 
courts could apply the Act of State Doctrine, absent an unambiguous and controlling 
international rule of law, to avoid judging foreign sovereigns’ acts within their own 
territories.  This comment argues that crystallized legal norms that meet Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain’s standard, but have not yet attained jus cogens status, also cannot be barred by 
the doctrine because they constitute an unambiguous rule of law.  Furthermore, courts 
violate separation of powers principles when they choose not to resolve properly-
presented claims on the merits because judicial resolution potentially could interfere with 
the political branches’ conduct of foreign relations.  The courts do not impermissibly 
interfere in foreign relations when they apply international law, whether treaty provisions 
or customary norms, created by the political branches.  If judicial resolution is not 
preferred, the political branches may exercise their constitutional powers to conclude an 
international agreement that resolves the litigants’ claims.  Courts further considering 
Papua New Guinea residents’ claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act should not apply 
the Act of State Doctrine where crystallized legal norms exist, because doing so would be 
contrary to the logic of Sabbatino.    
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, residents of Bougainville, an island in Papua New Guinea 
(“PNG”), brought a class action suit in the Central District of California 
against Rio Tinto PLC, an international mining conglomerate.  They sought 
redress for over three decades of human rights violations perpetrated by Rio 
Tinto through its strip mining operations and its participation in the PNG 
government’s violent suppression of civil dissent.  The victims brought their 
claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”)1 in Sarei v. Rio Tinto 
PLC,2 alleging violations of customary international law (“CIL”) norms 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Craig H. Allen for his generous guidance and incisive 
critiques of early drafts, as well as a special thanks to the members of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal.  These individuals graciously spent many hours growing weary of this comment to make it what it 
is.  The author is solely responsible for any misstatements or erroneous omissions.  
1
  The ATCA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2006), is a grant of jurisdiction to the district courts for “all 
causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”; 
the statute itself does not create a statutory cause of action.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 
(2004). 
2
  Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
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prohibiting severe environmental devastation, racial discrimination, 
genocide and crimes against humanity, and unlawful targeting of civilians 
during armed conflict.  By relying in part on the Act of State Doctrine 
(“ASD”), the federal district court granted defendant Rio Tinto’s motion to 
dismiss, barring a full determination on the merits.3  On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the dismissal, deciding that the ASD cannot bar claimed 
violations of non-derogable CIL norms, and remanded for reconsideration of 
whether the ASD may apply to claims based on less developed norms.4  
This case represents a broader misunderstanding in U.S. courts that 
the ASD applies whenever adjudication of claims derived from international 
human rights law may adversely impact the political branches’ conduct of 
foreign policy.  Although the PNG residents based their claims on firmly-
established international legal rules, the district court in Sarei applied the 
ASD in light of concerns expressed by the PNG government and the U.S. 
executive that continued litigation could impede the peace process 
concluding the decade-long civil war.  A correct understanding of the ASD, 
however, recognizes that courts may only apply the doctrine in the absence 
of applicable treaty provisions or widely-accepted CIL rules, because these 
rules represent obligations to which the U.S. and other sovereigns have 
mutually consented.  Further, applying the ASD creates the anomalous 
situation in which a court presumes the legal validity of Rio Tinto’s joint 
conduct with the PNG government, conduct that is prohibited under 
international human rights law.  
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino5 the Supreme Court held that 
the ASD would bar judicial scrutiny of a foreign state’s act to avoid potential 
interference with the political branches’ conduct of foreign relations, absent 
a treaty or other unambiguous agreement on a controlling rule of 
international law.  International human rights law comprises international 
treaties and widely-accepted CIL rules defining individuals’ fundamental 
rights vis-à-vis states.  Therefore, the availability of a widely accepted CIL 
rule defining a specific obligation precludes courts from applying the ASD.  
An “international law” exception to the doctrine for treaty obligations and 
crystallized CIL norms that represent unambiguous agreement between 
states on controlling points of law exists. 
Federal courts must apply both the domestic and international legal 
rules created by the political branches.  In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PNG residents 
brought their claims under the congressionally-enacted ATCA, which 
                                           
3
  Id. at 1120.   
4
  Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 456 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006). 
5
  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
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invokes CIL norms to which the U.S. and PNG have consented at the 
international level.  Federal courts should proceed with the litigation, unless 
preempted by an international agreement between the U.S. and PNG 
concerning the claims.  This is consistent with the federal judiciary’s 
responsibilities under the U.S. Constitution, and preserves the equal status 
CIL shares with explicit international agreements. 
Part II of this comment describes the factual basis of the PNG 
residents’ racial discrimination and environmental tort claims—the alleged 
joint conduct between Rio Tinto and the PNG government in the operation 
of the Panguna mine and during the country’s recent civil war.  Part III 
explains that the judicially-created ASD cannot prevent adjudication on the 
merits of politically sensitive cases according to governing international law.  
Part IV argues that separation of powers principles do not compel the ASD 
when a clear international rule is on point, because the political branches 
have participated in the creation and maintenance of that rule.  Part V asserts 
that courts cannot give dispositive weight to the executive’s Statements of 
Interest; instead, the political branches may take steps to resolve litigants’ 
claims through political channels if judicial resolution is not preferred.  Part 
VI argues that international human rights law and the separated powers 
structure of the U.S. Constitution entitles the PNG residents in Sarei to a full 
consideration on the merits of their claims.  Part VII concludes this 
Comment. 
II. RIO TINTO’S ALLEGED JOINT CONDUCT WITH THE PNG GOVERNMENT 
VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
From the 1960s until 1999, the residents of Bougainville suffered 
human rights abuses from Rio Tinto’s strip mining operations, which were 
officially sanctioned by the PNG government, and from the PNG military 
operations, which were assisted by Rio Tinto.  Although PNG has a 
functioning and constitutionally independent judicial system, the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement and succeeding legislation frustrated 
effective redress through local courts.  
A. The Strip Mining Operations Were Conducted with Wanton Disregard 
for Bougainvilleans’ Ways of Life and Wrought an Environmental 
Disaster 
In the 1960s, Rio Tinto, an international mining group headquartered 
in London, commenced plans to build a copper mine on the island of 
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Bougainville in Papua New Guinea (“PNG”).6  The PNG government 
officially sanctioned Rio Tinto’s operations in exchange for 19.1% of the 
mine’s profits.7  Through the “Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Act 
of 1974” (“the Copper Act”) the PNG government formally agreed to allow 
a Rio Tinto subsidiary, Bougainville Copper Ltd. (“BCL”), to develop the 
island’s naturally occurring mineral deposits.8  Residents of Bougainville 
have claimed that this arrangement effectively turned the copper mine into a 
joint venture between the PNG government and Rio Tinto, allowing Rio 
Tinto to act under the color of state law in its conduct of the mine’s 
operations and treatment of the local residents.9  
Constructing the mine required displacing villages and destroying 
over ten thousand hectares of rainforest with chemical defoliants and 
bulldozers.  From Rio Tinto’s first steps on the island in 1965, Bougainville 
residents consistently resisted efforts to build the mine.  In response, the 
Australian administrative government imprisoned two hundred native 
residents and explained that their land would be taken without compensation 
if they refused Rio Tinto’s offer of $105 per acre and $2 per coconut tree.10  
The residents did refuse, and one hundred riot police were sent in August of 
1969 to attack the unarmed villagers and force them off their land.11  
Construction began once the residents were removed from the site, 
and the mine became operational in 1972.12  It soon became one of the 
world’s largest copper mines and one of Rio Tinto’s most profitable projects, 
producing both copper and gold.13  Rio Tinto attracted about 6,300 foreign 
workers to Bougainville between 1966 and 1971.14  The corporation’s 
employment practices systematically discriminated against indigenous 
workers: “local Bougainvilleans, who were black, were paid significantly 
lower wages than white workers recruited off island.”15  In 1969, the 
Australian Minster of Labor accused Rio Tinto of paying black laborers 
“slave wages” after visiting Bougainville.16  The local residents alleged Rio 
                                           
6
  Sarei, 221 F. Supp.2d at 1121. 
7
  Id. 
8
  Id. at 1122. 
9
  Id. at 1121. 
10
  Id. at 1122. 
11
  Id.  
12
  Id. 
13
  Id. at 1123. 
14
  Id. at 1124. 
15
  Id. 
16
  Id. 
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Tinto treated the land with wanton disregard and intentionally violated their 
human rights because it viewed them as inferior.17 
The mine’s impact on the environment is staggering:  “[s]urrounded 
by dense rainforest and tropical stillness lies one of the world’s largest man-
made holes in the ground. . . .  It would take two Golden Gate Bridges to 
span the hole, and if the Empire State Building were set at the bottom, only 
the antenna on top would rise above the rim of the mine.”18  Poisonous 
gasses from the mine’s copper concentrator mixed into dust clouds that 
polluted the island’s atmosphere.19  The mine also poured more than one 
billion tons of waste rock and tailings into the Kawerong-Jaba river 
system.20  As the waste permeated the river system, “[f]ertile river valleys 
were turned into wasteland, entire forests died, and three thousand hectares 
of land were completely destroyed.”21  Villages could no longer sustain 
themselves through subsistence agricultural activities.22  The Jaba River 
deposited substantial amounts of discharged tailings into Empress Augusta 
Bay, killing the fisheries which provided a major source of food for 
Bougainvilleans.23  In March 1988 PNG’s Minister of the Environment, 
Perry Zeipi, described the destruction of all aquatic life by chemicals and 
waste as “dreadful and unbelievable” and found that the river water was not 
safe for drinking or even bathing.24  In total, the pollution has crippled the 
island’s crops and agricultural production, destroyed fish populations, and 
forced animals out of their habitats.  It has also caused the indigenous 
population to suffer asthma, respiratory infections, and, especially among 
children, health problems resulting from the diminished food supply.25  “Rio 
Tinto’s destruction of the island’s land and environment ‘ripped apart’ the 
culture, economy, and life of Bougainville.”26 
B. Civilians Were Unlawfully Harmed During the Civil War 
In 1988, the local population became increasingly restive, organizing 
a march against Rio Tinto, presenting a petition that demanded that the 
                                           
17
  Id. 
18
  Id. at 1123. 
19
  Id. 
20
  Id. 
21
  Id. 
22
  Id. 
23
  Id.  
24
  Id. at 1124. Discharge into the river included xanthates (ingestion of which is harmful), methyl 
isobutyl carbinol (a severe skin irritant in concentrate form), and polyacrylmide monomer (toxic and 
absorbable through the skin).  Id. 
25
  Id. 
26
  Id. 
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corporation localize employment and control over environmental 
degradation, and orchestrating a sit-in which stopped mining operations for 
one day.27  Rio Tinto responded by hiring a consulting company to report on 
the mine’s impact, but the document, labeled a “whitewash,” skirted 
critically important issues.28  Local militants then sabotaged the mine’s 
machinery, blowing up some of its infrastructure.29  
The violence escalated into a popular uprising against Rio Tinto and 
the PNG government.30  A Rio Tinto executive indicated to the PNG 
government that “Rio would seriously reconsider future investment in PNG 
in light of . . . the acts of terrorism on Bougainville resulting 
from . . . unrealistic expectations on the part of landowners”; Rio Tinto 
“intended that this ultimatum result in military action by PNG . . . even if it 
meant the death and/or injury of residents.”31  Fearful that Rio Tinto might 
actually divest its holdings on the island, the PNG government took its 
words “as commands.”32 
PNG sent in the Defense Force (“PNGDF”) in 1989, inaugurating the 
civil war.33  On February 14, 1990, the PNG army launched what has 
become known as the St. Valentine’s Day massacre.34  Rio Tinto assisted the 
army by supplying logistical support intended to enable the military to quash 
the rebellion so the mine could be reopened.35  Local resistance cohered to 
form the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (“BRA”), and “the struggle to 
close the mine became a struggle for independence” from PNG.36  
The conflict between the residents, PNG, and Rio Tinto lasted for ten 
years, resulting in “atrocious human rights abuses and war crimes.”37  To 
quell the rebellion and enable the mine to reopen, the PNG army initiated a 
blockade in April 1990 that deprived local residents of medicine, clothing, 
humanitarian aid, and other essentials for seven years.38  Bomb, gun, 
grenade, and ammunition attacks on the natives’ homes were hidden from 
                                           
27
  Id. at 1124-25. 
28
  Id. at 1125. 
29
  Id. 
30
  Id. 
31
  Id. 
32
  Id. 
33
  Id. at 1126. 
34
  Id. 
35
  Id. 
36
  Id. 
37
  Id. 
38
  Id.  
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international scrutiny, thus allowing PNG troops to commit human rights 
violations with impunity.39  
In addition to PNG’s attacks, deaths from preventable diseases 
accrued as a result of the blockade.  The local Red Cross estimated that in 
November 1992 more than 2,000 children had died due to a lack of medical 
care and vaccines.40  When the war officially ended in 1999, an estimated 
15,000 civilians, or 10% of the population, had been killed.41  Those who 
survived suffered health problems and about 67,000 lived in refugee 
camps.42  Human rights violations committed by PNG included aerial 
bombardments of and ground attacks against civilian targets, wanton killings 
and acts of cruelty, burning of homes and villages, outrages upon personal 
dignity, rape, humiliating and degrading treatment, perfidious uses of the 
Red Cross emblem, and pillages.43  
C. The Bougainville Peace Agreement and Succeeding Legislation 
Frustrated Attempts to Redress Human Rights Violations in PNG 
Courts 
In September 2000, PNG residents initiated a class action lawsuit in 
U.S. courts seeking redress for human rights violations allegedly committed 
by Rio Tinto and the PNG government acting in concert.  While PNG 
residents are able to seek redress from a constitutionally-secured 
independent judiciary, the ability to obtain effective judicial redress in PNG 
courts has not gone without scrutiny from Mr. Bacre Waly N’diaye, United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary 
executions.44 
The “Compensation (Prohibition of Foreign Legal Proceedings) Act of 
1995” required PNG residents to seek redress in local courts for all claims of 
injury arising from mining activities.45  The Act criminalized the pursuit of 
                                           
39
  Id. at 1127. 
40
  Id. at 1126. 
41
  Id. at 1127. 
42
  Id. 
43
  Id.  
44
  United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/1996/4/Add.2 (February, 27 1996) (stating 
that violations of human rights by the PNGDF and BRA have not been adequately investigated; the 
PNGDF commits brutal reprisals against civilians; the Constitution provides for civilian control over the 
armed forces, but the National Execution Council has failed to review the excesses of the PNGDF; the 
offices of Public Prosecutor and Public Solicitor have not initiated any cases to provide legal aid to the 
families of the victims; while a circuit court convenes periodically on Bougainville, the infrequency of its 
sittings “reflects the lack of a permanent legal structure to hear cases of violations of human rights carried 
out with impunity, thus precluding access to legal recourse where justified.”) 
45
  Compensation (Prohibition of Foreign Legal Proceedings) Act, No. 41 (1995) (Papua N.G.).  
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foreign proceedings, and punished such behavior with a substantial fine, 
imprisonment or both.46  If claims were originally filed in the courts of a 
foreign country, this legislation rendered any foreign judgment obtained 
unenforceable in PNG.47  
Peace negotiations following the worst of the violence, beginning in 
July 1997 and concluding with the Bougainville Peace Agreement on August 
30, 2001, further insulated Rio Tinto and the PNG government’s conduct 
from scrutiny.  The agreement provided amnesty to all sides for activities 
related to the crisis, in addition to a constitutionally-guaranteed referendum 
on Bougainville independence and a plan for disarmament.48 
Facing these obstacles to effective local redress, PNG residents 
brought their claims to the Central District in California.  Although they 
brought their suit under the ATCA, a federal statutory provision specifically 
granting jurisdiction for such claims, the victims faced the opposition of the 
U.S. executive to the adjudication of their claims.  In 2002, both the U.S. 
Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State and the then-current PNG 
government formally conveyed to the federal district court judge presiding 
over the case their concern that future judicial resolution of this controversy 
could affect national reconciliation in PNG under the peace agreement and, 
consequently, could adversely impact U.S. foreign relations.49  Based on 
these assertions, the U.S. district court dismissed in part the complaint under 
the ASD.50  
PNG residents appealed the dismissal and presented the U.S. appellate 
court with statements indicating that the new PNG government opposed the 
litigation because it concerned an action brought against only Rio Tinto as a 
defendant.51  The Ninth Circuit panel concluded that the trial court placed 
too much emphasis on the executive’s statement of interest and remanded 
                                           
46
  Id. 
47
  Id. 
48
  Bougainville Peace Agreement, signed at Arawa (2001) (Papua N.G.). 
49
  The executive’s statement of interest made the following points: “In our judgment, continued 
adjudication of the claims . . . would risk a potentially serious adverse impact on the peace process, and 
hence on the conduct of our foreign relations”; “The Government of Papua New Guinea . . . has stated its 
objection to these proceedings in the strongest terms”; and the PNG government “perceives the 
potentialimpact of this litigation on U.S.-PNG relations, and wider regional interests, to be ‘very grave.’” 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 456 F.3d 1069, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2006). 
50
  Sarei, 221 F. Supp.2d at 1193. 
51
  A letter from Joshua Kalinoe, Chief Secretary to the PNG Government, dated March 30, 2005, 
stating, “The government is not a party to this case.  Accordingly, it does not see the case presently before 
the courts affecting diplomatic and bilateral relations between our two countries nor does it see it affecting 
the peace process on the island of Bougainville”; and a letter to the State Department dated January 8, 
2005, from John Momis, the Interim Bougainville Provincial Governor, “urg[ing] the Government of the 
United States to support the Prime Minister’s position to permit the case to proceed in the courts of 
America.” Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1076. 
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the case for a re-balancing of the ASD factors in light of statements by PNG 
government officials to the effect that the government no longer opposes this 
litigation.52  Despite changing circumstances, the course of this litigation 
squarely presents the problem of whether a U.S. court may invoke the ASD 
to refuse to apply crystallized CIL when the U.S. executive states that 
continued litigation may impact adversely its conduct of foreign relations. 
III. PNG RESIDENTS HAVE A FEDERAL RIGHT OF ACTION FOR VIOLATIONS 
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
PNG residents sought redress for violations of their human rights in 
federal court in the U.S. by bringing suit against Rio Tinto.  Using U.S. 
courts to vindicate rights conferred by international human rights 
conventions and customary norms fits squarely within the courts’ 
constitutional responsibilities.  Congress authorized U.S. courts to apply CIL 
under the ATCA, provided that alien plaintiffs claim actual violations of 
international law.  PNG residents sufficiently alleged violations under CIL 
for war crimes and murder, crimes against humanity, racial discrimination, 
and environmental harms. 
A. Congress Opened U.S. Courts to Claims Brought by Foreign Citizens 
Under the ATCA 
The First Congress opened U.S. courts to alien plaintiffs asserting 
violations of international law when it enacted the ATCA.  Under the statute, 
“the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
[brought] by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”53  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that Congress reaffirmed the courts’ authority to apply CIL and 
treaty provisions when it passed the Torture Victims Protection Act 
(“TVPA”) in 1992.54 
                                           
52
  Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1086. 
53
  28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2006). 
54
  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1992’s 
legislative history states that § 1350 should “remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already 
exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law”). 
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B. Sosa Requires Plaintiffs Bringing Suit Under the ATCA to Allege 
Violation of a Crystallized CIL Rule 
The Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain55 approved the 
application of a customary norm as binding law if the norm is specifically 
defined by the law of nations, universally recognized, and considered 
obligatory among states.56  Claims brought under the ATCA must allege 
violations of norms with no “less definite content and acceptance among 
civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was 
enacted,”57 because the ATCA requires courts to “interpret international 
law . . . as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”58  
To apply Sosa’s standard, a court must examine both current state practice59 
and the international legal instruments upon which litigants rely.  This 
                                           
55
  542 U.S. 692. 
56
  Id. at 732 (“Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, 
and obligatory.”  (quoting with approval In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 
(9th Cir. 1994))). 
 CIL represents customary practices, which states have come to recognize as part of the duties they 
owe to each other and follow out of a sense of legal obligation.  Statute of the International Court of Justice 
art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITES STATES § 102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].  However, not all CIL 
norms are sufficiently definite to constitute one of the “laws of nations” invoked by the ATCA, because, by 
definition, customary rules evolve from an embryonic stage, in which states begin to acknowledge a 
particular pattern of conduct as desirable but not legally binding, to a state of crystallization, in which states 
widely agree that the norm has become an obligatory rule and defines a duty owed by states to one another 
and to individuals.  See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900); INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE ON THE FORMATION OF RULES OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 21 (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/customarylaw.pdf (2000) 
[hereinafter ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES] (A pattern of behavior may be commonly followed, but it 
may not rise to the status of a binding norm if states do not consistently and uniformly adhere to it). 
57
  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820), as an 
illustration of the specificity required).  Under Sosa courts must adopt a historical frame of reference to 
compare, and ultimately ascertain whether the proposed violation is denounced with the same exactitude as 
the pirate or slave trade in the 18th century.  
58
  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).  
59
  There is controversy over how to interpret state practices that contravene states’ obligations under 
international law.  On one hand, the International Court of Justice has held that how a state justifies its 
breach of a rule may strengthen the rule:  “[i]f a state acts in a way prima facie incompatible within the rule 
itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that 
attitude is to confirm rather than weaken the rule.”  Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.) 
1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 (June 27).  On the other hand, Professor Weisburd take a strictly behavioral perspective:  
“if a state’s behavior does not conform to its treaty obligations, it would be unreasonable to rely on the fact 
of treaty adherence in forming expectations as to future actions . . . the weight to be given treaty adherence 
. . . would depend on a state’s actual performance under the treaty.”  A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges 
and International Law, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1475, 1482 (2003). 
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inquiry establishes whether states consistently behave as they do because 
they believe that a CIL norm is legally obligatory.60 
The specific, universal, and obligatory standard embraces two 
categories of widely-accepted norms:  the narrow class constituting jus 
cogens61 and the broader class of crystallized norms that meet Sosa’s three-
dimensional standard but that have not obtained jus cogens status.  The level 
of state consent explains the difference between these two classes of norms.  
Jus cogens norms are non-derogable because their existence is no longer tied 
to states’ continuing consent.62  
Jus cogens and crystallized norms meet Sosa’s standard because they 
both enjoy widespread acceptance.  The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the 
practical equivalency of both kinds of norms:  “restrict[ing] actionable 
violations of international law to only those claims that fall within the 
categorical universe known as jus cogens would deviate from both the 
history and text of the ATCA,” because “[t]he notion of jus cogens norms 
was not part of the legal landscape when Congress enacted the ATCA in 
                                           
60
  United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 99-103 (2nd Cir. 2003) (explaining why the usage and 
practice of states constitute primary sources of CIL, and relegating the works of scholars to secondary 
sources).  Courts ascertain crystallized norms by parsing state practice and evaluating the scope of 
international legal instruments’ binding force.  Treaties may indicate when a norm attains the status of CIL, 
because states may obligate themselves to treating individuals according to defined standards; but such 
treaty obligations only carry evidentiary force to the extent that the provisions are actually legally binding.  
The evidentiary weight of a treaty increases the greater the number of states parties to the treaty (i.e., the 
more multilateral it is), whether more powerful states have signed on, and if states have taken measures to 
implement it domestically or to enforce its obligations internationally.  Flores v. Southern Peru Copper 
Corporation, 414 F.3d 233, 257 (2nd Cir. 2003).  States reduce evidentiary weight by attaching reservations 
(signaling that a state has opted not to assume a certain obligation) or understandings and declarations 
(explaining how a state interprets its obligations under the treaty). 
61
  Jus cogens norms permit no exceptions:  no state can object to the binding character of peremptory 
norms and refuse to abide by them, nor can any group of states agree to contravene them.  The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties offers the following definition:  “a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”  Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331.  Jus cogens norms include those prohibiting genocide, slavery or slave trade, murder or 
causing the disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), 
supra note 56, § 702 cmt. n. 
62
  “[J]us cogens embraces customary laws considered binding on all nations and is derived from 
values taken to be fundamental by the international community, rather than from the fortuitous or 
selfinterested [sic] choices of nations.  Whereas customary international law derives solely from the 
consent of states, the fundamental and universal norms constituting jus cogens transcend such consent . . . .  
Because jus cogens norms do not depend solely on the consent of states for their binding force, they enjoy 
the highest status within international law.”  Alvarez-Machain v. U.S., 331 F.3d 604, 613 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(ellipsis in original) (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th 
Cir.1992)). 
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1789.”63  The panel’s reasoning fits within the logic of the Supreme Court’s 
ultimate decision in Sosa.  The Sosa majority held that “courts should 
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm 
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms . . . .”64  
Nowhere in its opinion did the majority mention that only a norm having 
peremptory status would meet the Court’s standard.  
C. The ASD Allows U.S. Courts to Avoid Sitting in Judgment of a Foreign 
Sovereign’s Official Act, Absent a Controlling, Unambiguous Rule of 
International Law 
PNG residents rely on CIL rules meeting Sosa’s standard to seek 
redress in U.S. courts under the ATCA.  Despite meeting the jurisdictional 
threshold, the district court employed the judicially-crafted ASD and thereby 
refused to vindicate the victims’ properly-pled violations of their rights.65  
The ASD enables U.S. courts to avoid pronouncing a foreign 
sovereign’s official act legally invalid if the sovereign performs the act 
within its own territory.  U.S. courts applying the doctrine presume that a 
foreign state’s acts are consistent with its domestic laws and adopt the 
official act as a principle or rule of decision without fully evaluating the 
litigant’s allegations that bring the act into question.66  It allows courts to 
sidestep questioning the validity of sovereign acts taken by foreign states 
when judicial resolution would interfere with the executive’s conduct of 
foreign relations.67  The Supreme Court, however, did not leave the rule 
unqualified:  separation of powers principles pull in the other direction when 
a widely-accepted international rule of law provides a standard for assessing 
a foreign sovereign’s act, and justify judicial resolution.68 
                                           
63
  Id. at 614.  The panel also stated specifically “the fact that a violation of [jus cogens] is sufficient 
to warrant an actionable claim under the ATCA does not render it necessary.”  Id. at 613. 
64
  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
65
  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964). 
66
  W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990).  Whenever the 
matter in controversy depends upon the fact that “a foreign government has acted in a given way . . . the 
details of such action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be accepted by our courts as a 
rule for their decision.”  Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918). 
67
  Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404; Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 456 F.3d 1069, 1084 (9th Cir. 2006). 
68
  Although originally the doctrine derived from the sovereign equality of states, the Sabbatino Court 
transplanted it into separation of power principles.  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421 (international law does not 
require the ASD), 427-28 (the ASD depends upon “the proper distribution of functions between the judicial 
and political branches”).  The Court’s classic nineteenth-century statement of the doctrine rested on the 
idea that sovereign immunity insulated states from being judged by another state’s courts:  “[e]very 
sovereign is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country 
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.”  Underhill 
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The Supreme Court in Sabbatino recognized (and affirmed in 
Kirkpatrick69) that courts may not apply the doctrine where judicial 
resolution does not present a separation of powers problem.  In Sabbatino, 
the Court granted certiorari to elucidate “the proper role of the Judicial 
Branch” in the “conduct of foreign relations”70 and held:  
[R]ather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-
encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the Judicial 
Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property 
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, 
extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the 
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding 
controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that 
the taking violates customary international law.71  
The Court further stated that it is more appropriate for the judiciary to 
evaluate another state’s official act “the greater the degree of codification or 
consensus concerning a particular area of international law,” “the less 
important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations,” and “if 
the government which perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer in 
existence.”72  Where there is ascertainable agreement on an international 
legal rule, it is appropriate for the judiciary to resolve claims based on it, 
because “the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle 
to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a 
principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international 
justice.”73  The judicial application of a definite legal rule to which states 
have consented to be bound does not impermissibly interfere with the 
foreign policy set by the political branches. 
                                                                                                                              
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).  Congress’ enactment of statutory rules for determining when a 
foreign state may claim sovereign immunity, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A. § 
1330 (2000), Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989), confirms that the 
doctrine’s application is no longer rationalized by the principle of sovereign immunity.  That either plaintiff 
or defendant can invoke the ASD also exemplifies this departure from sovereign immunity. 
69
  Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409.  Justice Scalia explained that since Sabbatino the doctrine does not 
presume the validity of foreign states’ actions merely because resolution of cases and controversies by U.S. 
courts may embarrass foreign governments.  Id. 
70
  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 407. 
71
  Id. at 428. 
72
  Id. at 428.  It may be noted that the third factor analytically folds into the second, because it 
merely highlights that judicial resolution is far less likely to affect the conduct of foreign policy where the 
government committing the act in controversy is no longer in power.  See, e.g. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. 
Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977). 
73
  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. 
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Absent a widely accepted international legal rule, courts should avoid 
assessing a foreign sovereign’s official act for two reasons.  First, applying 
an international rule that does not yet receive the full consent of the 
international community constitutes impermissible interference because it 
amounts to a policy determination—properly made by the political branches 
rather than the Judicial Branch—about what the rule of law internationally 
should be.  Creating rules that structure international relationships is within 
the domain of the political branches; a court would give impermissible legal 
force to an international norm, which states have declined to make legally 
binding, if the court chose to apply that norm.  This usurps the power of the 
political branches to make the necessary policy judgments assigned to them 
under the Constitution in making treaties or creating customary international 
rules through consistent state practices.74  It also renders the judiciary 
vulnerable to having its pronouncements on international law completely 
disregarded because U.S. courts would be giving binding force to rules not 
consented to.75 
Second, the courts are institutionally incompetent to resolve an issue 
that touches sharply on national nerves, relative to the political branches, 
which have the capacity to secure the national interest by reaching an 
agreement diplomatically.76  The executive has the superior ability to 
manage international relations through the special competence it exercises in 
international negotiations.77  Furthermore, a condescending judicial 
pronouncement not predicated on widely-accepted legal principles may 
offend the foreign sovereign and complicate political resolution of the issue. 
The separation of powers problem is not present where a clear 
international rule is on point.  The Sabbatino majority recognized this, 
gesturing toward an “international law” exception to the ASD.  While the 
balancing test reflects the proper balance of the political branches’ and the 
                                           
74
  “When articulating principles of international law in its relations with other states, the Executive 
Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional rules, as would the courts, but 
also as an advocate of standards it believes desirable for the community of nations and protective of 
national concerns.”  Id. at 432-33. 
75
   “[G]iven the fluidity of present world conditions, the effectiveness of such a patchwork approach 
toward the formulation of an acceptable body of law concerning state responsibility for expropriations . . . .  
[This] rests upon the sanguine presupposition that the decisions of the courts . . . would be accepted as 
disinterested expressions of sound legal principles by those adhering to widely different ideologies.”  Id. at 
434-35. 
76
  Id. at 431-32. 
77
  Theoretically the executive can represent all those injured when bargaining with another sovereign 
and more effectively achieve some measure of redress.  Id. at 431-32. 
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judiciary’s respective constitutional roles,78 the Sabbatino Court emphasized 
that not “every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies 
beyond judicial cognizance.”79  Even when judicial resolution will likely 
resonate throughout international relationships, the application of an 
unambiguous international rule constitutionally outweighs the political 
branches’ desire for a more delicate handling of the controversy (unless the 
political branches decide to preempt litigation by concluding an international 
agreement).  In Sabbatino, the Court predicated its holding on the 
international community’s widely divergent views on public 
takings/expropriations.80  In spite of the Cold War tensions arising from the 
divergence between capitalist states and those with state-controlled 
economies, the Court stated that absent “a treaty or other unambiguous 
agreement regarding controlling legal principles”81 adjudication would not 
be inconsistent with separation of powers principles, notwithstanding the 
tenor of the issue’s implications for foreign relations.82  Properly understood, 
Sabbatino’s holding and rationale contradicts the gloss placed on the ASD 
by some lower federal courts and affirms other lower court decisions that 
concluded that the doctrine “was never meant to apply” where a sufficiently 
concrete and accepted rule governs an act’s validity.83  ASD applies only 
when compelled by its underlying policies. 
Where international obligations are crystallized in treaty obligations 
or in widely-accepted CIL, separation of powers principles compel the 
judiciary to decide cases and controversies that significantly affect the tenor 
of international relations.  Courts impermissibly interfere in the conduct of 
foreign relations when adjudication, in effect, imposes international rules on 
sovereigns who have not consented to those obligations. 
                                           
78
  The doctrine’s “continuing vitality” and specific application in any given case “depends on its 
capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches . . . on 
matters bearing upon foreign relations.”  Id. at 427. 
79
  Id. at 423 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)). 
80
  The Court confesses that “there are few if any issues in international law . . . on which opinion 
seems to be so divided” as expropriations.  Id. at 428.  It is “difficult to imagine . . . adjudication in an area 
which touches more sensitively the practical and ideological goals of . . . the community of nations.”  Id. at 
430. 
81
  Id. at 428. 
82
  The holding cannot be confined to the factual context of expropriations; the Court repeatedly 
declares that separation of powers principles animate the doctrine whenever a court is asked to decide the 
validity of a foreign state’s act. 
83
  Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see Kalamazoo Spice 
Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov’t of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984); American 
Int’l. Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1980). 
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IV. APPLYING EITHER UNAMBIGUOUS, WIDELY-ACCEPTED CIL RULES OR 
TREATY PROVISIONS DOES NOT RAISE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
CONCERNS THAT UNDERLIE THE ASD  
The “international law” exception to the ASD permits courts to 
examine foreign states’ official acts when their legal validity turns on a 
treaty obligation or crystallized CIL rule.  Even though adjudication may 
have strong implications for foreign affairs, a separation of powers problem 
does not arise when international law supplies a rule of decision—one 
established by the political branches either in a treaty or by the executive’s 
contributions to the development and maintenance of a CIL rule.84  The 
judiciary does not overstep its constitutional role because it is resolving 
cases and controversies according to the international rules and mutual 
obligations the executive has seen fit to make.  Whether applied via the 
Supremacy Clause as Article II treaties or as CIL pursuant to the ATCA, the 
judiciary gives force to international human rights instruments, including 
treaties, conventions, and other agreements formed by states’ political 
leaders.  Furthermore, the judiciary properly applies international law 
through its regular practice of considering the executive’s views of the 
meaning of treaty provisions and the content of CIL when interpreting 
international law.  
A. The Constitution Does Not Grant the Political Branches Plenary 
Power over Matters Touching on Foreign Relations 
The Constitution’s text allocates authority over matters touching on 
foreign relations across all three branches.  While the executive may have 
primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations under Article II, 
this cannot mean that the judiciary must check its Article III judicial power 
at the door whenever litigants’ claims entreat the courts to step into 
controversies touching on foreign relations.  Separation of powers principles 
stake out a protected sphere of foreign affairs authority (and consequently, a 
sphere of responsibility) belonging exclusively to the branch to which it is 
assigned.  They, therefore, constrict the expansion of one branch’s exercise 
of its foreign affairs powers to the derogation of the others’.  
The Take Care Clause is often cited as establishing the President’s 
dominance in the conduct of foreign relations by implication:  it grants the 
executive broad residual powers not specified in Article II from the 
                                           
84
  Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 1540. 
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penumbral authority emanating from several explicit grants.85  This 
interpretation may require Article II’s Take Care Clause to carry more 
weight than it is reasonable to believe the clause was ever intended to bear in 
light of the text and structure of the Constitution.  Professors Curtis Bradley 
and Martin Flaherty explain that a virtually unlimited grant of foreign 
relations power sits uneasily in light of the Constitution’s enumerated 
powers structure.  Therefore, a narrower interpretation is much more 
consistent with the Framers’ conception of executive power.86  The notion 
that every governmental decision touching on foreign affairs is exclusively 
entrusted to the executive has never been the law.87 
The Constitution enumerates specific powers to each branch that bring 
aspects of foreign affairs under their authority, in effect spreading out 
responsibility for elements of foreign affairs among the three branches.88  
Article III, § 2 extends the judicial power to “all cases” arising under the 
Constitution, federal laws, and “Treaties,” as well as to “Controversies . . . 
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects.”89  The Constitution’s text makes no exception for cases bearing 
weightily on foreign relations, if they otherwise meet the Article III, § 2 
grant extending the judicial power to all cases and controversies.  
In Kirkpatrick, the most recent case involving the ASD before the 
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia reminded us that the courts “have the power, 
and ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases and controversies properly 
presented to them.”90  Interpreting and applying the law—both domestic and 
                                           
85
  See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).  The Constitution explicitly names the President as the commander in 
chief of the military, U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1, and gives the President the power to make treaties with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2, and to appoint, U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, 
cl. 2, and receive Ambassadors, U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3. 
86
  Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 545, 602-4 (2004).  They identify interpretations of Article II contrary to the notion of 
executive dominance that are equally defensible and well-grounded in the Constitution’s text.  Id. at 553-
59. 
87
  In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., the Supreme Court carefully qualified its broad 
characterization of the executive’s foreign affairs power by emphasizing that it is “a power which . . . like 
every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the 
Constitution.”  299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).  Reid v. Covert recognized constitutionally imposed limits to the 
political branches’ range of permissible foreign policies and empowers the courts to uphold those 
limitations.  354 U.S. 1 (1957).  The Court clarified what this means for the judiciary’s involvement in 
foreign affairs in Baker v. Carr:  the Court starkly declared it cannot be thought that “every case or 
controversy which touches on foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”  Banco Nacional de Cuba 
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211). 
88
  For example, the Constitution assigns to the Legislature the familiar enumerated powers 
implicating foreign affairs under Article I, § 8.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
89
  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
90
  W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990). 
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international—are inherently judicial functions, and the judiciary “cannot 
shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant 
political overtones.”91  The Sabbatino Court originally stated that the 
Constitution “does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to 
review the validity of foreign acts of state.”92  Rather, the doctrine provides a 
rule of decision to prevent judicial resolution of litigants’ rights from 
bleeding into foreign policymaking which is not the responsibility of the 
judiciary.  
B. The Judiciary Fulfills its Responsibilities Under Article III and the 
Supremacy Clause by Applying Treaties and CIL Rules Meeting Sosa’s 
Standard 
By adjudicating the cases and controversies that are properly before it, 
the judiciary gives force to separation of powers principles.  As a 
counterpoise to the political branches’ law-making and law-enforcing 
powers, Article III, joined by Article VI’s Supremacy Clause, assigns to 
courts the power to interpret the law.  The Paquete Habana93 dispelled any 
doubt that international law is “part of our law.”94  Articles III and VI 
textually commit to the judiciary the responsibility of applying treaties.  The 
federal courts have the authority to apply CIL via the Supremacy Clause at 
least with political branch authorization and, potentially, more broadly as 
federal common law.  
1. Self-Executing Treaties Are Judicially Enforceable Under the 
Supremacy Clause 
Self-executing Article II treaties and congressional-executive 
agreements provide rules of decision for U.S. courts.  They grant private 
individuals rights, which may be vindicated in domestic courts and are 
“[t]reaties, made . . . under the Authority of the United States” which qualify 
as “the supreme law of the land.”95  Non-self-executing treaties, on the other 
hand, are not judicially-enforceable unless Congress enacts implementing 
legislation and creates a private right of action.96  One of the very few 
                                           
91
  Japan Whaling Ass’n. v. Amer. Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
92
  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. 
93
  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
94
  Id. at 700. 
95
  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.  The President makes Article II treaties “by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate. . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
96
  Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) “Our constitution declares a treaty to be the 
law of the land.  It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the 
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treaties purporting to establish fundamental human rights obligations for 
states that the United States has ratified is the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).  When ratifying the treaty, however, 
Congress stipulated that its substantive provisions were not self-executing 
and exempted the United States from certain obligations.97  Many human 
rights treaties are neither self-executing nor implemented through 
congressional legislation.98 
2. CIL Is Judicially Enforceable Under the Supremacy Clause, Either as 
Federal Common Law, or when the Judiciary Applies It Pursuant to 
Political Branch Authorization 
Under international law, states may enter into multilateral treaties to 
codify customary law.99  The status of CIL under the U.S. Constitution is 
presently uncertain because the Constitution does not recognize CIL as a 
source of positive domestic law.100  Chief Justice Marshall made clear that 
“the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the 
                                                                                                                              
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.  But when the terms 
of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty 
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract 
before it can become a rule for the Court.”  Id. 
97
  When Congress ratifies or implements a treaty, however, it may opt not to assume specific treaty 
obligations through stating reservations, declarations or understandings that denote the United States’ 
interpretation of the duties and extent to which it has consented to be bound.  See Domingues v. Nevada, 
961 P.2d 1279 (1998). 
98
  See, e.g. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123. 
99
  A rule established by treaty may supersede obligations placed on the parties by a prior customary 
rule, unless the parties intend otherwise.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 56, § 102 cmt. j. (1987).  
Multilateral treaty provisions usually are non-self-executing, but their terms can evidence CIL norms 
among states.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is a case in point.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), 
supra note 56, § 102 cmt. f.  
100
  The Constitution is mostly silent about the domestic status of customary international law.  
Customary law only appears as the object of one of Congress’ enumerated powers:  Article I, § 8 vests 
Congress with the power “[t]o define and punish . . . [o]ffenses against the Law of Nations.”  U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  The “law of nations” is conspicuously missing where one might expect to find it 
mentioned again—either within Article III’s definition of the scope of the judicial power or in the 
Supremacy Clause.  The text of the Constitution itself is not likely to lead one to conclude that customary 
legal rules should have equal weight or authority as treaties or domestic laws.  The Paquete Habana dispels 
any doubt—subordinating CIL to a controlling legislative or executive act.  On the other hand, if one 
seriously scrutinizes the difference in the Supremacy Clause and Article III’s texts, the Constitution may 
suggest that the “law of nations” constitutes a category of laws that are not “made in Pursuance” of the 
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2, cl. 2, and yet are “Laws of the United States” under Article III, U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  See William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some 
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 705 (2002).  The history of the Constitutional 
Convention provides material suggesting this difference in text evidences some of the Framers’ belief that 
the “law of nations” was within Article III’s grant of jurisdiction.  Id. at 707.  
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land.”101  The Paquete Habana, however, held that U.S. courts can “resort” 
to and apply CIL only “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive 
or legislative act or judicial decision” on point.102  Until the Supreme Court 
clarifies the Constitutional status of CIL, we do not know precisely to what 
extent CIL is a part of our law—whether U.S. courts can freely construe 
CIL’s content in any case or controversy over which the court has general 
federal question jurisdiction, or only when the political branches have 
statutorily authorized the application of CIL to resolve certain cases and 
controversies.103 
While the Supreme Court has yet to resolve this controversy, Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain may suggest that the Court will side with the dominant 
position, allowing the courts free construction of CIL.104  If the dominant 
view prevails, then CIL will be an international source of domestic law that 
shares the same status as treaties under the Supremacy Clause.  On the other 
                                           
101
  The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (emphasis added).  The Framers’ and early 
Courts’ usage of the term “law of nations” equates to our contemporary understanding of CIL. 
102
  175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
103
  The first position posits that the political branches must authorize the courts to invoke CIL in 
either of two ways:  1) Congress can enable U.S. courts to apply CIL by enacting a statue like the ATCA, 
pursuant to its constitutional power to invoke the law of nations, see generally Note, An Objection to Sosa 
– And to the New Federal Common Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2077 (2006) (Pursuant to Congress’ 
enumerated power in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, Congress enacted in 1789 the Alien Tort Statute, 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2006), and in 1992 the Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 
(1992)), or 2) the political branches can incorporate customary law into domestic law by signing and 
ratifying treaties that codify customary law, pursuant to the Treaty Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
Either way CIL indirectly acquires a binding character under the Supremacy Clause via the enabling statute 
or the Article II treaty—but only under circumstances identified by the controlling statute or treaty. 
 The second position equates CIL’s constitutional status to that of federal common law.  Even 
though Congress has not mandated the courts to invoke CIL, most scholars and courts agree that CIL 
should be treated as part of federal common law and apply it to resolve cases.  See generally Curtis A. 
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the 
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (labeling the consensus among courts and scholars that 
customary law has the status of federal common law as the “modern position”, but proceeding to reveal the 
dubious assumptions required by this view); Ernest A. Young, Sorting out the Debate Over Customary 
International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002) (discussing the debate between those who subscribe to the 
modern position and the revisionist view held by Bradley and Goldsmith).  This approach fits with The 
Paquete Habana’s instruction that CIL “must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of 
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination.”  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. 
104
  The Court stated the loss of “some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism” did not 
deprive the federal courts of “all capacity to recognize enforceable international norms. . . .”  Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 703 (2004).  And elsewhere, the Court expressed the view that Sabbatino 
did not question the application of international law “in appropriate cases, and it further endorsed the 
reasoning of a noted commentator who had argued that Erie should not preclude the continued application 
of international law in federal courts.”  Id. at 730 n.18 (citing Phillip C. Jessop, The Doctrine of Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740 (1939)).  Indeed, Erie opened 
the door “to the emergence of a federal decisional law in areas of national concern” and resituated CIL on 
this basis.  See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie–and the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
383, 405 (1964). 
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hand, if the Court adopts the revisionist view, then U.S. courts could apply 
CIL only when plaintiffs rely on a federal statue that authorizes the courts to 
apply CIL, such as the ATCA.  Under both views, the judiciary has a 
mandate either directly from the Supremacy Clause or from Congress via the 
Supremacy Clause to apply CIL to resolve cases and controversies properly 
before the courts.  The difference rests in how expansive the category of 
cases is in which U.S. courts may apply CIL—whether the courts are limited 
to the cases specifically recognized by the political branches’ authorization 
or whether courts can apply CIL to any case over which it has general 
federal question jurisdiction. 
C. U.S. Courts Articulate the Executive’s Foreign Policies by Applying 
Crystallized CIL Rules to Which the United States and Other 
Sovereigns Have Mutually Consented 
When Congress enacted the ATCA and ratified certain treaty 
provisions negotiated by the executive, the representative political branches 
deliberately defined and conferred rights derived from international law on 
private entities.  The Supreme Court has stated that it is not the proper role 
of the Judicial Branch to construe causes of action that the political branches 
have seen fit to provide in ways that contravene their intent.105  The courts 
undercut the separated-powers structure of the U.S. Constitution if they 
apply the doctrine under the misconception that preserving the executive’s 
lead role in foreign relations is a greater separation of powers concern than 
upholding the judiciary’s own responsibilities (and private parties’ rights) 
under the Constitution.  Circuit Judge Edwards has asserted that “[t]o ignore 
the Supreme Court’s cautious delineation of the doctrine in . . . Sabbatino 
and its progeny, and to cite the doctrine’s rationale as broad justification for 
effectively nullifying a statutory grant of jurisdiction, is, in my view, an 
inappropriate exercise of lower federal court power.”106  In effect, a court 
“[v]igorously waving in one hand a separation of powers banner, ironically, 
with the other . . . renounces the task that Congress has placed before” the 
courts.107 
                                           
105
  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716.  The ATCA must be construed to have the practical effect the First 
Congress intended—to “cause infractions of treaties, or the law of nations to be punished. . . .”  See Id.;   
Johnson v. Collins Entm’t Co., 199 F.3d 710, 729 (4th Cir. 1999) (Luttig, concurring) (“If the Congress 
sees fit to provide citizens with a particular cause of action, then we as federal courts should entertain that 
action—and unbegrudgingly.”). 
106
  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (J. Edwards, concurring). 
107
  Id. 
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1. Crystallized CIL Rules, which Meet Sosa’s Standard, Represent the 
Executive and Foreign Sovereigns’ Unambiguous Assent to 
Controlling Legal Principles 
The Sabbatino majority’s primary anxiety was that courts would 
interfere in the conduct of foreign relations by declaring legal relations 
among states and between states and private entities that were not widely 
accepted by states.108  This would raise a separation of powers problem 
because courts would be making policy determinations about U.S. foreign 
policy interests and which legal rules are appropriate to pursue them.109  
Applying crystallized CIL, like self-executing treaty provisions, does not 
raise separation of powers concerns, however, because the political branches 
demonstrate their consent to be bound through entering into mutual 
obligations with other states.110  
Derived from state consent, treaties and CIL represent equally binding 
legal obligations under international law.  When political leaders enter into 
international agreements, reflected in crystallized CIL or in treaties, they 
effectively relinquish some measure of state sovereignty for perceived 
advantages.111  Because the political branches have expressly provided the 
courts with rules of decision through judicially-enforceable self-executing 
treaties and treaties implemented by congressional enactments, a judicial 
determination that an act of state runs contrary to these obligations cannot be 
said to interfere with the expressed objectives of the political branches.112  
Like treaty obligations, a crystallized CIL rule is one to which the executive 
                                           
108
  In Sabbatino the Court refused to recognize CIL defining acceptable expropriations and duties 
states owe to dispossessed foreign owners because there were no signs that states widely agreed on such 
principles.  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428-29.  Ascertaining an unsettled norm and declaring it a rule of law 
amounts to active participation in the creation or codification of international law.  This is a function 
reserved to the executive branch, which acts “as an advocate of standards it believes desirable for the 
community of nations and protective of national concerns.”  Id. at 433.  The judicial branch wanders into 
the executive’s constitutional territory when it defines international rules that have not been enshrined in 
treaties nor have attained the highest degree of consensus. 
109
  Policy choices and value determinations are constitutionally committed to the political branches.  
See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
110
  The political branches, in the conduct of foreign policy, decide to make commitments with leaders 
of other nation-states to secure foreign affairs objectives deemed to be in the national interest.  See Jack 
Goldsmith & Eric Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999). 
111
  See generally Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 539] (1992).  All international agreements “create law for the states parties thereto . . . .”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 56, § 102(3), and in the case of a dispute “establish[] rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states.”  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993. 
112
  For example, modern FCN treaties between the U.S. and other states exemplify Sabbatino:  where 
such a treaty right has been violated, the executive does not express concern that adjudication would pose a 
problem. See Kalamazoo, 729 F.2d 422; Am. Int’l Group, 493 F.Supp. 522. 
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has consented by participating in its creation and maintenance.  Also like 
treaty obligations, courts can read the indicia of CIL to make an objective 
determination of what course of action the political branches have decided is 
within the national interests.113  U.S. courts applying CIL uphold the 
international legal relationships defined through the political branches’ 
conduct of foreign relations.114 
CIL meeting Sosa’s standard thus fits Sabbatino’s requirement of 
some “other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal 
principles”.115  The policies underlying Sosa’s specific, universal and 
obligatory standard match those that preoccupied the Sabbatino majority, 
despite the fact that the Sosa majority was primarily concerned with defining 
the “law of nations” in a way that would be congruent with the 
understanding of the First Congress, which passed the ATCA.  Sabbatino’s 
inquiry into the status of customary law against expropriations aligns with 
Sosa’s inquiry into whether alleged CIL norms are specific, universal and 
obligatory—the main point of both is to avoid holding states to binding rules 
to which they did not consent.  Referring to the standard it adopted, the Sosa 
majority remarked that the potential implications for foreign relations justify 
a high bar to recognizing new private causes of action under CIL.116   
Crystallized CIL reflects deeply-ingrained, reciprocal expectations 
which the political branches have determined are in the national interest to 
make and abide by.  Its wide acceptance establishes its legitimacy and well-
settled character.  The extent to which such a crystallized norm enjoys the 
broad consent of states means that neither the political branches nor other 
states could genuinely contest the existence of the rule in international law 
or that it was transgressed by an act of state.  Federal courts remedying 
embryonic CIL rules essentially intrude upon the political branches’ 
competence and constitutional roles as international lawmakers.117  When a 
new rule surpasses Sosa’s high bar, however, it alleviates the disruption 
                                           
113
  Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 110, at 1169-70. 
114
  U.S. courts confirm whether the political branches have supported or acquiesced in the putative 
norm’s crystallization, i.e. by enacting the norm into domestic statutory law (See, e.g., Torture Victim 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)), or opposed it. 
115
  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 428.   
116
  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (“[M]odern international law is very much concerned with . . . rules that 
would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their citizens . . . .”). 
117
  When courts apply customary law that has not yet crystallized, they move beyond their 
institutional competence and constitutional role because they are essentially making political judgments 
about the value of emerging norms.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 695 (courts “imping[e] on the discretion of the 
Legislative and Executive branches in managing foreign affairs.”).  The Sabbatino majority decided the 
ASD barred a claim challenging a Cuban expropriation decree, because there was no treaty provision on 
point and expropriations in the 1960s was an area of international law evidencing no consensus as to legal 
standards.  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428-30. 
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created by courts imposing new legal rules upon other states in the name of 
applying existing international law.  
2. Courts Properly Defer to the Executive Branch’s Foreign Policy 
Powers when They Interpret of International Rules According to 
Political Branches’ Understanding of Them 
Courts appropriately consider the political branches’ understanding of 
international rules because the political branches, as the lawmakers, can 
explain the intent behind treaty provisions and whether certain state 
practices are adhered to out of a sense of legal obligation.  Similar to the 
weight accorded legislative history when construing a statute, courts give 
great weight to the meaning of treaties as expressed by the departments of 
the government charged with their negotiation and enforcement.118  The 
executive also has special competence in ascertaining the nature of 
international rules because the executive’s statements and behavior in the 
international arena are a source of CIL.119  From experience participating in 
international politics, the executive can attest to whether a norm is generally 
and consistently followed.  Professor Curtis Bradley suggests this deference 
also can be understood as a form of Chevron deference:  courts may presume 
that Congress has delegated interpretive power to the executive because of 
his special expertise in foreign matters, arising from both the President’s role 
as the negotiator who speaks on behalf of the nation and from the executive 
agencies’ superior access to relevant facts.120  This kind of deference 
expresses the ordinary respect due to the coordinate, law-making 
branches.121 
Conventional judicial practices for treaty interpretation and judicial 
application of Sosa’s standard for CIL results in substantive agreement 
between those making international law and those definitively interpreting it.  
Thus, deference to the executive in interpretive issues effectively alleviates 
Sabbatino’s anxieties.  It avoids hampering the executive’s negotiations or 
creating uncertainty in international relationships caused by multifarious 
                                           
118
  Considering the executive’s understandings of international rules allows courts to read treaties, 
like other contracts, in light of the conditions and circumstances existing when they were negotiated and to 
give effect to the parties’ intents.  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262 
(1984). 
119
  Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 707-09 (2000). 
120
  Id. at 701-07. 
121
  David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1439 (1999). 
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pronouncements on the legal validity of a foreign sovereign’s act.122  The 
fact that the CIL rule is universally accepted weakens the foreign state’s 
bargaining position and buttresses the U.S. executive’s position.  Therefore, 
adjudication according to a crystallized CIL rule is more properly 
understood as a continuation of states’ expectations regarding the duties they 
owe to each other and to private entities. 
This kind of deference also mitigates the foreign policy implications 
of insulting foreign states.123  States that violate crystallized human rights 
laws cannot expect to avoid the disapprobation of the international 
community or judicial review of their acts by U.S. courts.124  Courts cannot 
presume that a government which transgresses such a widely accepted rule 
of law could be any more offended by a condescending U.S. court opinion 
than by the international disapprobation that it will inevitably confront.  
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the Judicial Branch should be 
viewed as constraining or embarrassing the executive when it adjudicates 
cases bearing on foreign affairs.  It is widely known by those negotiating 
with the U.S. that the executive is constrained not just by the courts but by 
the American constitutional structure, including Congress.  The executive 
may employ these constraints in negotiations by articulating its limited 
ability to meet foreign sovereigns’ expectations because of the institutional 
constraints presented by the separation of powers.125  Moreover, foreign 
leaders negotiate with the President, not the courts, to achieve their 
objectives.  One would expect that the executive’s condescending or 
ambivalent statements would more significantly affect the tenor and course 
of negotiations than judicial pronouncements.  
A universally recognized rule of law alleviates potential 
embarrassment to the executive because ordinary judicial practice in 
                                           
122
  The fear concerns situations in which courts might hold that an international law standard either 
has or has not been met when the executive has stated the contrary belief.  Cf. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 433.  
This is accomplished when courts examine sources of international law for the extent to which the 
executive and members of the international community have agreed to be bound.  See, e.g. Flores v. S. Peru 
Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding the “rights to life and health” insufficiently definite to 
constitute CIL rules). 
123
  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432. 
124
  The Restatement states that the ASD would not bar a claim alleging violation of fundamental 
human rights, such as torture or genocide, because “the accepted international law of human rights . . . 
contemplates external scrutiny of such acts.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 56, §443 comment c.  In 
Doe v. UNOCAL, the court decided judicial resolution would not substantially exacerbate foreign relations 
with Burma by connecting the strong international consensus against jus cogens violations of human rights 
to the U.S. criticism of the Burmese government’s acts.  Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 959 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
125
  Robert Putnam has elaborated on how the executive makes use of domestic institutional 
constraints to strengthen its bargaining power.  See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: 
The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988). 
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discerning the meaning of international law obviates disagreement between 
the executive and the judiciary on the substantive content of definite 
international rules.  The executive’s stated interest in Sarei v. Rio Tinto 
confirms this expectation.  The executive did not deny that the PNG 
government’s actions provided a basis for the claims.  Instead, it merely 
stated that continued adjudication could adversely impact U.S. foreign 
relations with PNG.126  The executive appears to have taken the stance that 
alleged human rights violations are better resolved politically rather than 
judicially.  
V. COURTS SHOULD NOT ABIDE BY EXECUTIVE STATEMENTS THAT 
JUDICIAL RESOLUTION WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONSHIPS WHERE CLEAR INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIES 
The executive’s expressed preference for political resolution as “[a] 
statement of national interest alone . . . does not take the present litigation 
outside of the competence of the judiciary.”127  This preference does not 
warrant upsetting the usual constitutional order, which implies for Sarei v. 
Rio Tinto that the victims’ claims brought under the ATCA are 
constitutionally committed to the judiciary for resolution.128  Therefore, the 
judiciary should proceed to resolve the victims’ claims, recognizing that the 
political branches may take the necessary steps to enter into an international 
agreement with PNG that would politically address the claims. 
A. U.S. Courts Are Constitutionally Prohibited from Categorically 
Deferring to the Executive 
Assertions by the executive that the courts should apply the ASD 
doctrine cannot be given more weight than the policies underlying the 
doctrine can bear.  Courts have the constitutional authority to determine 
when their Article III responsibilities and the Supremacy Clause compel 
them to redress rights violations.129  In another case concerning the ASD not 
                                           
126
  Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1075-76, 1082 
127
  Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004). 
128
  See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (1995) (“Not every case ‘touching foreign relations’ is 
nonjusticiable, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 . . . (1962) . . . and judges should not reflexively invoke 
these doctrines to avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive decisions in the context of human rights.  We 
believe a preferable approach is to weigh carefully the relevant considerations on a case-by-case basis.  
This will permit the judiciary to act where appropriate in light of the express legislative mandate of the 
Congress in section 1350, without compromising the primacy of the political branches in foreign affairs.”). 
129
  The Ninth Circuit recently expounded on this idea in discussing whether claims against the 
Vatican Bank were associated with crimes committed against European Jews under the Nazi regime.  Even 
though extensive negotiations by the executive have resulted in international agreements with Germany 
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long after Sabbatino, a plurality of the Court rejected the notion that courts 
must defer categorically to the executive’s views.130  Separation of powers 
principles require judicial independence here:  unquestioning judicial 
acceptance would turn the Court into “a mere errand boy for the Executive 
Branch which may choose to pick some people’s chestnuts from the fire, but 
not others’.”131  More recently, the Sosa Court recognized “there is a strong 
argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive 
Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy,”132 but judicial 
consideration of executive views must not become unquestioning 
deference.133  
Rather than giving dispositive weight to the executive’s assertions of 
interference, courts should carefully parse the executive’s statement of 
interest in conjunction with the record in order to assess the strength of the 
executive’s interest in avoiding judicial resolution compared to the 
judiciary’s responsibilities under the Constitution.134  The Ninth Circuit 
rejected the district court’s application of the doctrine and instructed the 
lower court to re-weigh the Sabbatino factors for the claimed violations of 
CIL norms not amounting to jus cogens rules because the district court relied 
too heavily on the executive’s statement of interest.135  The panel 
                                                                                                                              
regarding claims related to the Nazi era, the court noted that the “Constitution does not relegate [the courts] 
to the sidelines.  We are a player in adjudicating claims, and a crucial one at that.”  Alperin v. Vatican 
Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 558 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 409).  Unquestioning 
acceptance and “reflexively tossing the ball into the political branches’ court . . . .” amounts to abdicating 
that role.  Id. 
130
  First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972); Id. at 772-73 
(Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 778 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
131
  Id. at 773 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
132
  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.  The Supreme Court recently instructed that should the executive 
branch “choose to express its opinion on the implications of exercising jurisdiction over particular 
petitioners in connection with their alleged conduct, that opinion might well be entitled to deference as the 
considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of foreign policy.”  Republic of Austria v. 
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004).  
133
  Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1081 (“Ultimately, it is our responsibility to determine whether a political 
question is present, rather than to dismiss on that ground simply because the Executive Branch expresses 
some hesitancy about a case proceeding.”).  
134
  Compare “[the court] may not assess whether the policy articulated is wise or unwise, or whether 
it is based on misinformation or faulty reasoning.”  Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1182, with “[the court] may 
take notice of the government’s official policy position and opinion . . . for the limited purpose of assessing 
the strength of the government’s interest” Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (citing American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir. 1995)).  A noted scholar has disagreed with 
the courts’ ability to assess the executive’s statement of the foreign policy interests at stake, but similarly 
has concluded that courts should not accord them dispositive weight.  See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New 
Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1415-16 (1999) (Courts are 
not institutionally competent to “divine” the foreign policy interests at stake in a particular context and how 
to pursue them—these are political decisions constitutionally assigned to the branches with the expertise 
and institutional structure to make them.). 
135
  Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1085-86. 
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determined, even if continued adjudication would present “some risk to the 
Bougainville peace process” and the executive may “prefer that the suit 
disappear,” the Statement of Interest’s “nonspecific invocations of risk to the 
peace process” did not establish that adjudication would touch sharply on 
foreign relations.136  The record also demonstrated that the U.S. “had little 
involvement” in the foreign conflict that gave rise to the claims.137  
B. Judicial Resolution Does Not Prevent the Political Branches from 
Taking Action to Secure a Desired Outcome 
Courts should not, by deferring to the executive’s stated interests, 
permit the executive to avoid taking action.  Instead, courts should push the 
political branches to manage these claims through political channels, a 
judicial action that is consistent with the separated powers system.  
Any consequences of judicial resolution viewed as adverse to foreign 
policy interests cannot be considered “so significant as to warrant a reversal 
of the usual assumptions of our constitutional order.”138  When courts 
perform their usual responsibilities to decide cases, the political branches 
can step in to correct any “underprotection error”—a judicial decision that 
does not adequately protect the nation’s foreign policy interests.139  Professor 
Jack Goldsmith argues that it is reasonable to expect the political branches to 
redress such errors if the political branches perceive them as such.140  These 
“decision costs” are precisely the kind that the political branches, which are 
institutionally competent and accountable to the people, should absorb under 
the Constitution.141  On the other hand, when courts apply the ASD, in spite 
of clear international law, due to the stated interests of the executive, they 
exhibit an unyielding deference to the political branches and over-protect the 
conduct of foreign policy under the Constitution.  The political branches 
cannot be expected to correct this extreme, judicially-created deference 
because the practical effect is to widen the political branches’ foreign affairs 
powers. 
The formalist approach to the ASD advocated here preserves the 
doctrine as formulated in Sabbatino—as a prudential choice-of-laws 
                                           
136
  Id. at 1082. 
137
  Id. 
138
  Goldsmith, supra note 134, at 1412. 
139
  Id. at 1419-20. 
140
  Id. at 1420.  This is because the executive has the power to preempt claims in U.S. courts or shape 
their outcome.  See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); In re Nazi Era Cases Against 
German Defendants Litigation, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.N.J. 2001); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. 
Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).  
141
  Goldsmith, supra note 134, at 1437. 
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doctrine for situations in which states have not agreed to restrict their 
sovereign conduct through clear international obligations.  The usual 
assumptions of the separated powers system, along with a pragmatic view of 
the practice of international relations, argues against allowing courts to 
employ the doctrine as a functional, sliding-door to refuse judicial 
application of clear international law in U.S. courts.  
C. Using the ASD to Presume the Validity of a Foreign State’s Act Which 
Is Invalid Under International Law Detracts from the Rule of Law 
Internationally and Derogates Litigants’ Rights 
The international law exception to the ASD doctrine entrenches the 
role of U.S. courts in the application of international law when appropriate.  
In certain circumstances, treaty obligations and customary law are directly 
applicable in the resolution of claims between private parties.  U.S. courts 
have always had the task of vindicating violations of rights conferred by 
international law.  This is reflected in the Framers’ explicit incorporation of 
treaty law into the Constitution, the First Congress’ invocation of the law of 
nations in the ATCA, and Congress’ recent instantiation of CIL in the federal 
statute books by enacting the TVPA.  It is starkly anomalous that a 
judicially-created prudential doctrine should be used to presume the validity 
of acts clearly invalid under international law.  That judicial resolution may 
embarrass foreign governments does not, in itself, establish an exception to 
the constitutional assumption that courts have “the power, and ordinarily the 
obligation, to decide cases and controversies . . . .”142  The judiciary cannot 
“allow the fate of a litigant to turn on the possible political embarrassment of 
the Department of State and it is not this Court’s role to encourage or require 
nonexamination by limiting a rule of law with the domestic public relations 
of the Department of State.”143  It compromises the integrity of those rights 
as well as that of the law that confers them. 
Refusing to apply crystallized CIL under the ASD is tantamount to 
denying the “existence or purport” of the customary rules themselves.144  
The development of international human rights law has been a political 
struggle to embed certain fundamental and basic rights for individuals vis-à-
vis states into the legal fabric of the international community.  Allowing the 
doctrine to override a crystallized rule or treaty obligation not only 
contravenes the Sabbatino majority’s concern for rendering decisions 
                                           
142
  Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409. 
143
  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 467 (White, J., dissenting). 
144
  Id. at 457. 
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consistent with the national interest and international justice (which coincide 
in firmly established principles of international law), but also unwinds the 
“stability of relationships and preservation of reasonable expectations”145 
secured by the international rule of law. 
VI. THE ASD IS NOT A DEFENSE TO PNG RESIDENTS’ CLAIMS ALLEGING 
VIOLATIONS OF CRYSTALLIZED CIL RULES 
Both the federal district court and a Ninth Circuit panel agreed that 
PNG residents’ alleged violations of CIL implicate specific, universal, and 
obligatory CIL norms.  Before both courts, Rio Tinto argued that the PNG 
residents’ racial discrimination and environmental tort claims trigger the 
ASD because their resolution requires a court to evaluate the legal validity 
of the Rio Tinto’s joint conduct with the PNG government in the operation 
of the mine and during the civil war.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit properly 
reversed the district court’s decision to apply the ASD because of the 
character of the CIL rules forming the basis of the PNG residents’ claims. 
The claims that derive from international human rights law “assert jus 
cogens violations that form the least controversial core of modern day ATCA 
jurisdiction.”146  Specifically, PNG residents assert that the PNG government 
and the PNG military (PNGDF), acting as Rio Tinto’s agents during the civil 
war, violated the laws of war by torturing and murdering innocent civilians 
through the medical blockade, bombing of civilian targets, wanton killing 
and acts of cruelty, burning homes and villages, raping women, and pillaging 
the island.147  They also contend that the defendants’ support for and 
involvement in the medical blockade constituted genocide and crimes 
against humanity.148  Moreover, Rio Tinto’s policy of treating the indigenous 
                                           
145
  Id. at 453. 
146
  Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729-30). 
147
  Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1139-49 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995), for 
the conclusion that the Geneva Conventions codify the laws of war, along with various federal court 
decisions explicating the requirements for liability under the Conventions.  See Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1950, for the United States Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, for the United States Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, for the United 
States Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, for the United States Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
75 U.N.T.S. 287.). 
148
  Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1149-51. (citing a federal court decision that quotes The Nurnberg 
(Nuremberg) Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 130 (Int’l Military Tribunal 1946), for the statement “[w]hile some of the 
same offenses that violate the laws and customs of war are also crimes against humanity, crimes of the 
latter sort most notably include murder, extermination, enslavement . . . or persecutions on political, racial 
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people as inferior, destroying their villages, the environment, sacred sites 
and local culture, and supporting the blockade constituted racial 
discrimination.149  The Ninth Circuit found the ASD could not shield these 
official acts by the PNG government from judicial scrutiny.  Such acts would 
constitute jus cogens violations, and states are not permitted under 
international law to act contrary to jus cogens norms.  “Because 
‘[i]nternational law does not recognize an act that violates jus cogens as a 
sovereign act,’ . . . the alleged acts of racial discrimination cannot constitute 
official sovereign acts . . . .”150  A condition precedent of the doctrine—an 
official act of state—did not occur because sovereigns cannot officially 
violate non-derogable obligations. 
Similarly, the ASD should not bar the environmental tort claims.  The 
residents allege that Rio Tinto unlawfully harmed the environment by failing 
to fulfill its duty to avoid serious and irreversible environmental or human 
health effects.151  “[A]lthough the alleged UNCLOS [United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea] violations represent violations of 
international law, the UNCLOS provisions at issue do not yet have a status 
that would prevent PNG’s acts from simultaneously constituting official 
sovereign acts.”152  Alleged violations of norms which have not yet attained 
the status of jus cogens are subject to ASD balancing:  the federal courts 
must determine whether these CIL rules meet Sosa’s standard and therefore 
survive Rio Tinto’s invocation of the ASD.  The Ninth Circuit remanded 
                                                                                                                              
or religious grounds . . . of entire racial, ethnic, national or religious groups,” Id. at 1149; and another 
federal court decision quoting the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
which has been ratified by more than 120 nations, including the United States, to define the term ‘genocide’ 
as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such:  (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births with the 
group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group,” Id. at 1151.). 
149
  Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-55. (citing Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 717, which notes that 
the Restatement “identif[ies] jus cogens norms prohibiting genocide, slavery, murder or causing 
disappearance of individuals, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination”).  The 
district court also rooted the norm prohibiting racial discrimination in numerous international agreements. 
150
  Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1085 (citing Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 718).  See also Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 289, 345 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) (“[J]us cogens 
violations are considered violations of peremptory norms, from which no derogation is permitted.  Acts of 
state to the contrary are invalid.”). 
151
  Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1160-63 (citing two provisions in the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea:  (1) one requiring that “states take ‘all measures . . . that are necessary to prevent, reduce 
and control pollution of the marine environment' that involves 'hazards to human health, living resources 
and marine life through the introduction of substances into the marine environment;’” and (2) another 
mandating that states “adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine 
environment caused by land-based sources.”). 
152
  Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1086. 
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resolution of this issue to the district court with the reminder that foreign 
policy concerns are merely one of the factors to consider.153  It was improper 
for the district court to rely heavily on the executive’s expressed concern 
over the potential consequences of adjudication in its resolution of these 
allegations; the real issue is whether these international rules have become 
sufficiently crystallized to fall within the categories of laws that the judiciary 
is constitutionally committed to interpret and apply.  Should a federal court 
find that the UNCLOS claims constitute violations of a CIL norm meeting 
Sosa’s standard, the court cannot apply the ASD to bar a full consideration 
on the merits. 
Refusing to apply the ASD in this situation would not only comply 
with the judiciary’s constitutional responsibilities under the American 
constitutional system of separated powers, but it also would appropriately 
push the political branches to respond to the PNG residents’ claims in a 
manner that is consistent with their own constitutional powers.  If litigation 
is not the desired method of resolving these claims, the political branches 
may enter into an international agreement with the PNG government that 
resolves the claims on more acceptable terms.  If they were expressly barred 
by a treaty,154 an executive agreement,155 or the subject of ongoing 
negotiations or formal steps by the political branches to reach a 
settlement,156 the claims derived from non-jus cogens norms would be 
removed from the judiciary and placed within the power of the political 
branches.  Recent litigation against foreign private entities arising from their 
alleged complicity in the atrocities committed during the Holocaust 
demonstrates that international agreements made by the political branches 
may render adjudication of certain claims off limits under the Political 
Question Doctrine.157  Both the district court and the appellate panel that 
considered Sarei v. Rio Tinto recognized that the political branches had not 
taken any action with respect to the PNG residents’ claims; the executive 
                                           
153
  Id. 
154
  See Alperin, 410 F.3d at 550 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1). 
155
  Id. at 550 (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981), and American Ins. Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415-16 (2003)). 
156
  Id. at 550 (explaining that the United States and Germany entered into the Foundation Agreement 
to establish a foundation to oversee compensation of the victims’ claims); Id. at 558 (attesting to the 
judiciary’s role in resolving claims where “[n]o ongoing government negotiations, agreements, or 
settlements are on the horizon.”); See also Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1234 (finding judicial 
consideration of certain claims appropriate where “by its own terms, [the Foundation Agreement] does not 
provide a basis to dismiss or suspend litigation against German companies stemming their actions during 
the National Socialist era.”). 
157
  See Alperin, 410 F.3d 532; Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d 1227; Nazi Era Cases Against German 
Defendants Litigation, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370; Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424; Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d 
248. 
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merely had expressed the desire that the case be resolved in Rio Tinto’s 
favor to maintain the stability of the domestic peace agreement.158  For the 
courts to allow mere statements by the executive, without more, to guide the 
outcome of litigation is a more functionalist approach to the Constitution 
than our system of separated powers can justify. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Treaty obligations and any crystallized CIL norm which meets Sosa’s 
specific, universal, and obligatory standard will preclude application of the 
ASD.  The separation of powers policies underlying the ASD are 
appropriately respected when courts apply codified or crystallized 
international rules of law.  Congress, by enacting the ATCA, has availed 
victims of human rights abuses access to U.S. courts to redress violations of 
their fundamental human rights under international law.  The U.S. executive, 
along with Congress, has taken great steps to define those rights by 
participating in the creation and maintenance of treaty regimes and 
customary norms.  Therefore, U.S. courts properly fulfill their Article III 
responsibilities and the Supremacy Clause’s mandate by providing litigants, 
who rely on treaty obligations and widely-accepted CIL rules, with a full 
resolution of their claims on the merits.  
The ATCA entitles the PNG residents in Sarei to the jurisdiction of 
U.S. courts.  Because they have based many of their claims on international 
law of the highest order—law which squarely fits Sabbatino’s description of 
“unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles”159—U.S. 
courts may submit to judicial review the unlawful acts perpetrated against 
the residents.  Only judicial consideration of those claims that do not depend 
on crystallized legal principles amounts to impermissible interference with 
the political branches’ conduct of foreign policy.  Vindicating litigants’ rights 
and the constitutional role of the judiciary cannot be conditioned on how 
politically sensitive the case at bar may be for domestic or international 
politics. 
                                           
158
  Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1178-79 (noting general comments made by the Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright that the United States’ official policy to support PNG’s territorial integrity and the peace 
process for resolving the Bougainville crisis); Id. at 1181 (noting Attorney General William Howard Taft 
IV’s comments that the official policy of the U.S. is to support the peace process); Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1082 
(noting that the executive’s Statement of Interest, alone, presents “no independent reason why the claims 
presented to us raise any warning flags as infringing on the prerogatives of our Executive Branch.”).  
159
  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). 
